---
title: Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility
description: An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically linked libraries) responsible for Windows credential management. This technique...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/credential_access_credential_dumping_msbuild
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility
An instance of MSBuild, the Microsoft Build Engine, loaded DLLs (dynamically linked libraries) responsible for Windows
credential management. This technique is sometimes used for credential dumping.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
- logs-endpoint.events.library-*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*

**Rule Severity**: high
**Risk Score**: 73
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Credential Access
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Sysmon

**Version**: 213
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Potential Credential Access via Trusted Developer Utility

The Microsoft Build Engine is a platform for building applications. This engine, also known as MSBuild, provides an XML schema for a project file that controls how the build platform processes and builds software.
Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy the execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. `MSBuild.exe` is a signed Microsoft binary, and the execution of code using it can bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow `MSBuild.exe` execution.
This rule looks for the MSBuild process loading `vaultcli.dll` or `SAMLib.DLL`, which indicates the execution of credential access activities.> **Note**:
This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Examine the command line to identify the `.csproj` file location.
- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
  - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
  - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
  - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
  - $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
  - $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.


### False positive analysis

- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.


### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).


## Rule Query

```eql
sequence by process.entity_id
 [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and (process.name : "MSBuild.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "MSBuild.exe")]
 [any where host.os.type == "windows" and (event.category == "library" or (event.category == "process" and event.action : "Image loaded*")) and
  (?dll.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL") or file.name : ("vaultcli.dll", "SAMLib.DLL"))]
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Credential Access
- Id: TA0006
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/)
- Technique:
  - Name: OS Credential Dumping
- Id: T1003
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Security Account Manager
- Id: T1003.002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Credentials from Password Stores
- Id: T1555
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Windows Credential Manager
- Id: T1555.004
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
- Id: T1127
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: MSBuild
- Id: T1127.001
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/)