IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping
editCredential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping
editIdentifies attempts to export a registry hive which may contain credentials using the Windows reg.exe tool.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Credential Access
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Credential Acquisition via Registry Hive Dumping Dumping registry hives is a common way to access credential information as some hives store credential material. For example, the SAM hive stores locally cached credentials (SAM Secrets), and the SECURITY hive stores domain cached credentials (LSA secrets). Dumping these hives in combination with the SYSTEM hive enables the attacker to decrypt these secrets. This rule identifies the usage of `reg.exe` to dump SECURITY and/or SAM hives, which potentially indicates the compromise of the credentials stored in the host. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate script execution chain (parent process tree). - Confirm whether the involved account should perform this kind of operation. - Investigate other alerts related to the user/host in the last 48 hours. - Investigate if the file was exfiltrated or processed locally by other tools. - Scope potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (e.g., 4624) to the target host. ### False positive analysis - Administrators can export registry hives for backup purposes using command line tools like `reg.exe`. Check whether the user is legitamitely performing this kind of activity. ### Related rules - Registry Hive File Creation via SMB - a4c7473a-5cb4-4bc1-9d06-e4a75adbc494 ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Scope compromised credentials and disable affected accounts. - Reset passwords for potentially compromised user and service accounts (Email, services, CRMs, etc.). - Reimage the host operating system and restore compromised files to clean versions. ## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editprocess where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.pe.original_file_name == "reg.exe" and process.args : ("save", "export") and process.args : ("hklm\\sam", "hklm\\security")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
-
Technique:
- Name: OS Credential Dumping
- ID: T1003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Security Account Manager
- ID: T1003.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: LSA Secrets
- ID: T1003.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/