IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification
editDisabling User Account Control via Registry Modification
editUser Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass User Access Control (UAC) protection.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=796
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 7
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Setup If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editregistry where event.type == "change" and
registry.path :
(
"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA",
"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin",
"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop"
) and
registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- ID: T1548
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Bypass User Account Control
- ID: T1548.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- ID: T1548
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Bypass User Account Control
- ID: T1548.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/