Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI
editSuspicious Cmd Execution via WMI
editIdentifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
- endgame-*
- logs-system.security*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Execution
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
Version: 110
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Setup
editSetup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
event.ingested to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
Rule query
editprocess where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
process.args : "\\\\127.0.0.1\\*" and process.args : ("2>&1", "1>")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
- ID: T1047
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Windows Command Shell
- ID: T1059.003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/