IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.

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Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation

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Suspicious PrintSpooler Service Executable File Creation

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Detects attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities related to the Print Spooler service. For more information refer to the following CVE’s - CVE-2020-1048, CVE-2020-1337 and CVE-2020-1300 and verify that the impacted system is patched.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
endgame-*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Privilege Escalation
Data Source: Elastic Endgame
Use Case: Vulnerability
Data Source: Elastic Defend
Data Source: Sysmon

Version: 107

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Setup

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Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2. Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp. For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html

Rule query

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file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
  process.name : "spoolsv.exe" and file.extension : "dll" and
  file.path : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*") and
  not file.path : (
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\SysWOW64\\PrintConfig.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\x5lrs.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\sysWOW64\\x5lrs.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\PrintConfig.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\x64\\*.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\DRIVERS\\W32X86\\*.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\PRTPROCS\\x64\\*.dll",
    "?:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\spool\\{????????-????-????-????-????????????}\\*.dll"
  )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- ID: T1068
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/

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