Suspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process
editSuspicious Endpoint Security Parent Process
editA suspicious Endpoint Security parent process was detected. This may indicate a process hollowing or other form of code injection.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
- logs-windows.*
- endgame-*
- logs-system.security*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
Version: 112
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Setup
editSetup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define event.ingested
and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
event.ingested
to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
Rule query
editprocess where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.name : ("esensor.exe", "elastic-endpoint.exe") and process.parent.executable != null and /* add FPs here */ not process.parent.executable : ( "?:\\Program Files\\Elastic\\*", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\wermgr.exe", "?:\\Windows\\explorer.exe" ) and not ( process.parent.executable : ( "?:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\SecurityHealthHost.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe" ) and process.args : ( "test", "version", "top", "run", "*help", "status", "upgrade", "/launch", "/enable" ) )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Masquerading
- ID: T1036
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- ID: T1036.005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/