Potential Privilege Escalation via Service ImagePath Modification

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Potential Privilege Escalation via Service ImagePath Modification

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Identifies registry modifications to default services that could enable privilege escalation to SYSTEM. Attackers with privileges from groups like Server Operators may change the ImagePath of services to executables under their control or to execute commands.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.registry-*
  • logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
  • winlogbeat-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Execution
  • Tactic: Privilege Escalation
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend
  • Data Source: Sysmon

Version: 2

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and process.executable != null and
  event.action == "modification" and registry.value == "ImagePath" and
  registry.key : (
    "*\\ADWS", "*\\AppHostSvc", "*\\AppReadiness", "*\\AudioEndpointBuilder", "*\\AxInstSV", "*\\camsvc", "*\\CertSvc",
    "*\\COMSysApp", "*\\CscService", "*\\defragsvc", "*\\DeviceAssociationService", "*\\DeviceInstall", "*\\DevQueryBroker",
    "*\\Dfs", "*\\DFSR", "*\\diagnosticshub.standardcollector.service", "*\\DiagTrack", "*\\DmEnrollmentSvc", "*\\DNS",
    "*\\dot3svc", "*\\Eaphost", "*\\GraphicsPerfSvc", "*\\hidserv", "*\\HvHost", "*\\IISADMIN", "*\\IKEEXT",
    "*\\InstallService", "*\\iphlpsvc", "*\\IsmServ", "*\\LanmanServer", "*\\MSiSCSI", "*\\NcbService", "*\\Netlogon",
    "*\\Netman", "*\\NtFrs", "*\\PlugPlay", "*\\Power", "*\\PrintNotify", "*\\ProfSvc", "*\\PushToInstall", "*\\RSoPProv",
    "*\\sacsvr", "*\\SENS", "*\\SensorDataService", "*\\SgrmBroker", "*\\ShellHWDetection", "*\\shpamsvc", "*\\StorSvc",
    "*\\svsvc", "*\\swprv", "*\\SysMain", "*\\Themes", "*\\TieringEngineService", "*\\TokenBroker", "*\\TrkWks",
    "*\\UALSVC", "*\\UserManager", "*\\vm3dservice", "*\\vmicguestinterface", "*\\vmicheartbeat", "*\\vmickvpexchange",
    "*\\vmicrdv", "*\\vmicshutdown", "*\\vmicvmsession", "*\\vmicvss", "*\\vmvss", "*\\VSS", "*\\w3logsvc", "*\\W3SVC",
    "*\\WalletService", "*\\WAS", "*\\wercplsupport", "*\\WerSvc", "*\\Winmgmt", "*\\wisvc", "*\\wmiApSrv",
    "*\\WPDBusEnum", "*\\WSearch"
  ) and
  not (
    registry.data.strings : (
        "?:\\Windows\\system32\\*.exe",
        "%systemroot%\\system32\\*.exe",
        "%windir%\\system32\\*.exe",
        "%SystemRoot%\\system32\\svchost.exe -k *",
        "%windir%\\system32\\svchost.exe -k *"
    ) and
        not registry.data.strings : (
            "*\\cmd.exe",
            "*\\cscript.exe",
            "*\\ieexec.exe",
            "*\\iexpress.exe",
            "*\\installutil.exe",
            "*\\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe",
            "*\\msbuild.exe",
            "*\\mshta.exe",
            "*\\msiexec.exe",
            "*\\msxsl.exe",
            "*\\net.exe",
            "*\\powershell.exe",
            "*\\pwsh.exe",
            "*\\reg.exe",
            "*\\RegAsm.exe",
            "*\\RegSvcs.exe",
            "*\\regsvr32.exe",
            "*\\rundll32.exe",
            "*\\vssadmin.exe",
            "*\\wbadmin.exe",
            "*\\wmic.exe",
            "*\\wscript.exe"
        )
  )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM