Potential LSASS Clone Creation via PssCaptureSnapShot

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Potential LSASS Clone Creation via PssCaptureSnapShot

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Identifies the creation of an LSASS process clone via PssCaptureSnapShot where the parent process is the initial LSASS process instance. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection and dump LSASS memory for credential access.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-system.*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Credential Access
  • Data Source: Sysmon
  • Data Source: System

Version: 108

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Setup

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Setup

This is meant to run only on datasources using Windows security event 4688 that captures the process clone creation.

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2. Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp. For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html

Rule query

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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code:"4688" and
  process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and
  process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM