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Privileges Elevation via Parent Process PID Spoofing

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Privileges Elevation via Parent Process PID Spoofing

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Identifies parent process spoofing used to create an elevated child process. Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.process-*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Privilege Escalation
Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 7

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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/* This rule is compatible with Elastic Endpoint only */

process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and

 /* process creation via seclogon */
 process.parent.Ext.real.pid > 0 and

 /* PrivEsc to SYSTEM */
 user.id : "S-1-5-18"  and

 /* Common FPs - evasion via hollowing is possible, should be covered by code injection */
 not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Wermgr.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\Wermgr.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and
 /* Logon Utilities */
 not (process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
     process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe")) and

 not process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe" and

 not (process.code_signature.subject_name in
           ("philandro Software GmbH", "Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH", "Projector.is, Inc.",
            "TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx LLC", "Dell Inc") and process.code_signature.trusted == true) and

 /* AM_Delta_Patch Windows Update */
 not (process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\MpSigStub.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\MpSigStub.exe") and
      process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\wuauclt.exe",
                                   "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\wuauclt.exe",
                                   "?:\\Windows\\UUS\\Packages\\Preview\\*\\wuaucltcore.exe",
                                   "?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\wuauclt.exe",
                                   "?:\\Windows\\UUS\\amd64\\wuaucltcore.exe",
                                   "?:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UUS\\*\\wuaucltcore.exe")) and
 not (process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\MpSigStub.exe", "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\MpSigStub.exe") and process.parent.executable == null) and

 /* Other third party SW */
 not process.parent.executable :
                   ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\HEAT Software\\HEAT Remote\\HEATRemoteServer.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\VisualCron\\VisualCronService.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files\\BinaryDefense\\Vision\\Agent\\bds-vision-agent-app.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files\\Tablet\\Wacom\\WacomHost.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\LogMeIn\\x64\\LogMeIn.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\EMC Captiva\\Captiva Cloud Runtime\\Emc.Captiva.WebCaptureRunner.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files\\Freedom Scientific\\*.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Google\\Chrome Remote Desktop\\*\\remoting_host.exe",
                    "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\GoToAssist Remote Support Customer\\*\\g2ax_comm_customer.exe") and
 not (
    process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.code_signature.subject_name == "Netwrix Corporation" and
    process.name : "adcrcpy.exe" and process.parent.executable : (
      "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Netwrix Auditor\\Active Directory Auditing\\Netwrix.ADA.EventCollector.exe",
      "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Netwrix Auditor\\Active Directory Auditing\\Netwrix.ADA.Analyzer.exe",
      "?:\\Netwrix Auditor\\Active Directory Auditing\\Netwrix.ADA.EventCollector.exe"
    )
 )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Create Process with Token
- ID: T1134.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Parent PID Spoofing
- ID: T1134.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004/

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