Suspicious Explorer Child Process

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Identifies a suspicious Windows explorer child process. Explorer.exe can be abused to launch malicious scripts or executables from a trusted parent process.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.process-*
  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
  • endgame-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References: None

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Initial Access
  • Tactic: Defense Evasion
  • Tactic: Execution
  • Data Source: Elastic Endgame
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend
  • Data Source: Sysmon

Version: 109

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Setup

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Setup

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2. Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp. For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html

Rule query

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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
  (
   process.name : ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe", "cmd.exe", "mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe") or
   process.pe.original_file_name in ("cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "RUNDLL32.EXE", "Cmd.Exe", "MSHTA.EXE", "REGSVR32.EXE")
  ) and
  /* Explorer started via DCOM */
  process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding" and
  not process.parent.args:
          (
            /* Noisy CLSID_SeparateSingleProcessExplorerHost Explorer COM Class IDs   */
            "/factory,{5BD95610-9434-43C2-886C-57852CC8A120}",
            "/factory,{ceff45ee-c862-41de-aee2-a022c81eda92}"
          )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM