AdminSDHolder Backdoor

Detects modifications in the AdminSDHolder object. Attackers can abuse the SDProp process to implement a persistent backdoor in Active Directory. SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain’s AdminSDHolder object, regaining their Administrative Privileges.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-system.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Persistence
Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
Data Source: Active Directory
Data Source: System

Version: 210

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

edit

event.action:("Directory Service Changes" or "directory-service-object-modified") and event.code:5136 and
  winlog.event_data.ObjectDN:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Valid Accounts
- ID: T1078
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Domain Accounts
- ID: T1078.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/

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