AdminSDHolder Backdoor
editAdminSDHolder Backdoor
editDetects modifications in the AdminSDHolder object. Attackers can abuse the SDProp process to implement a persistent backdoor in Active Directory. SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain’s AdminSDHolder object, regaining their Administrative Privileges.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-system.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring
- Data Source: Active Directory
- Data Source: System
Version: 210
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
editevent.action:("Directory Service Changes" or "directory-service-object-modified") and event.code:5136 and
winlog.event_data.ObjectDN:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System*
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Valid Accounts
- ID: T1078
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Domain Accounts
- ID: T1078.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/