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Parent Process PID Spoofing
editParent Process PID Spoofing
editIdentifies parent process spoofing used to thwart detection. Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 100 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.14.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
edit/* This rule is compatible with Elastic Endpoint only */ sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=5m [process where event.type == "start" and process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name != "system" and ( process.pe.original_file_name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "eqnedt32.exe", "fltldr.exe", "mspub.exe", "msaccess.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "msbuild.exe", "mshta.exe", "wmic.exe", "cmstp.exe", "msxsl.exe") or process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*.exe", "?:\\ProgramData\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*") or process.code_signature.trusted != true ) ] by process.pid [process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.Ext.real.pid > 0 and /* process.parent.Ext.real.pid is only populated if the parent process pid doesn't match */ not (process.name : "msedge.exe" and process.parent.name : "sihost.exe") ] by process.parent.Ext.real.pid
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
Rule version history
edit- Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
/* This rule is compatible with Elastic Endpoint only */ sequence by host.id, user.id with maxspan=5m [process where event.type == "start" and process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name != "system" and ( process.pe.original_file_name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "eqnedt32.exe", "fltldr.exe", "mspub.exe", "msaccess.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "msbuild.exe", "mshta.exe", "wmic.exe", "cmstp.exe", "msxsl.exe") or process.executable : ("?:\\Users\\*.exe", "?:\\ProgramData\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*") or process.code_signature.trusted != true ) ] by process.pid [process where event.type == "start" and process.parent.Ext.real.pid > 0 and /* process.parent.Ext.real.pid is only populated if the parent process pid doesn't match */ not (process.name : "msedge.exe" and process.parent.name : "sihost.exe") ] by process.parent.Ext.real.pid
-
- Version 2 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only