IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.
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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.16] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation

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Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation

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Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Privilege Escalation
  • Data Source: Sysmon

Version: 206

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Setup

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Setup

Named Pipe Creation Events need to be enabled within the Sysmon configuration by including the following settings: condition equal "contains" and keyword equal "pipe"

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2. Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp. For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html

Rule query

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file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action : "Pipe Created*" and
 /* normal sysmon named pipe creation events truncate the pipe keyword */
  file.name : "\\*\\Pipe\\*"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

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