IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.

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Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity

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Potential OpenSSH Backdoor Logging Activity

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Identifies a Secure Shell (SSH) client or server process creating or writing to a known SSH backdoor log file. Adversaries may modify SSH related binaries for persistence or credential access via patching sensitive functions to enable unauthorized access or to log SSH credentials for exfiltration.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

auditbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Linux
Threat Detection
Persistence
Credential Access

Version: 2

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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file where event.type == "change" and process.executable : ("/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/ssh") and
  (
    file.name : (".*", "~*") or
    file.extension : ("in", "out", "ini", "h", "gz", "so", "sock", "sync", "0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9") or
    file.path :
    (
      "/private/etc/*--",
      "/usr/share/*",
      "/usr/include/*",
      "/usr/local/include/*",
      "/private/tmp/*",
      "/private/var/tmp/*",
      "/usr/tmp/*",
      "/usr/share/man/*",
      "/usr/local/share/*",
      "/usr/lib/*.so.*",
      "/private/etc/ssh/.sshd_auth",
      "/usr/bin/ssd",
      "/private/var/opt/power",
      "/private/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts",
      "/private/var/html/lol",
      "/private/var/log/utmp",
      "/private/var/lib",
      "/var/run/sshd/sshd.pid",
      "/var/run/nscd/ns.pid",
      "/var/run/udev/ud.pid",
      "/var/run/udevd.pid"
    )
  )

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Technique:
- Name: Modify Authentication Process
- ID: T1556
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Compromise Client Software Binary
- ID: T1554
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1554/

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