IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Suspicious PowerShell Engine ImageLoad
editSuspicious PowerShell Engine ImageLoad
editIdentifies the PowerShell engine being invoked by unexpected processes. Rather than executing PowerShell functionality with powershell.exe, some attackers do this to operate more stealthily.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editlibrary where dll.name : ("System.Management.Automation.ni.dll", "System.Management.Automation.dll") and /* add false positives relevant to your environment here */ not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\sdiagnhost.exe") and not process.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\*\.exe""" and not process.name : ( "Altaro.SubAgent.exe", "AppV_Manage.exe", "azureadconnect.exe", "CcmExec.exe", "configsyncrun.exe", "choco.exe", "ctxappvservice.exe", "DVLS.Console.exe", "edgetransport.exe", "exsetup.exe", "forefrontactivedirectoryconnector.exe", "InstallUtil.exe", "JenkinsOnDesktop.exe", "Microsoft.EnterpriseManagement.ServiceManager.UI.Console.exe", "mmc.exe", "mscorsvw.exe", "msexchangedelivery.exe", "msexchangefrontendtransport.exe", "msexchangehmworker.exe", "msexchangesubmission.exe", "msiexec.exe", "MsiExec.exe", "noderunner.exe", "NServiceBus.Host.exe", "NServiceBus.Host32.exe", "NServiceBus.Hosting.Azure.HostProcess.exe", "OuiGui.WPF.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "pwsh.exe", "SCCMCliCtrWPF.exe", "ScriptEditor.exe", "ScriptRunner.exe", "sdiagnhost.exe", "servermanager.exe", "setup100.exe", "ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe", "SPCAF.Client.exe", "SPCAF.SettingsEditor.exe", "SQLPS.exe", "telemetryservice.exe", "UMWorkerProcess.exe", "w3wp.exe", "wsmprovhost.exe" )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- ID: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/