Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation

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Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation

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Identifies a privilege escalation attempt via rogue named pipe impersonation. An adversary may abuse this technique by masquerading as a known named pipe and manipulating a privileged process to connect to it.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Privilege Escalation
  • Sysmon Only

Version: 102

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Named Pipe Creation Events need to be enabled within the Sysmon configuration by including the following settings:
`condition equal "contains" and keyword equal "pipe"`

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

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file where event.action : "Pipe Created*" and
 /* normal sysmon named pipe creation events truncate the pipe keyword */
  file.name : "\\*\\Pipe\\*"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM