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Process Created with an Elevated Token

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Process Created with an Elevated Token

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Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Privilege Escalation

Version: 1

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */

process where event.action == "start" and

 /* CreateProcessWithToken and effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for token theft */
 user.id : "S-1-5-18"  and

 /* Token Theft target process usually running as service are located in one of the following paths */
 process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :
                ("?:\\Windows\\*.exe",
                 "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                 "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                 "?:\\ProgramData\\*") and

 not (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
      process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and process.parent.args : "/debug") and

 not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
                           "?:\\windows\\system32\\WerMgr.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe")  and

 not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe", "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
 "C:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*") and


 not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
      process.code_signature.subject_name in ("philandro Software GmbH", "Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH", "Projector.is, Inc.", "TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx LLC", "Dell Inc"))

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Create Process with Token
- ID: T1134.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/

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