IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.

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Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update

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Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update

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Identifies the remote update to a computer account’s DnsHostName attribute. If the new value set is a valid domain controller DNS hostname and the subject computer name is not a domain controller, then it’s highly likely a preparation step to exploit CVE-2022-26923 in an attempt to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to domain admin privileges.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

winlogbeat-*
logs-system.*
logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Privilege Escalation
Active Directory

Version: 104

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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sequence by winlog.computer_name with maxspan=5m

  [authentication where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "logged-in" and
   winlog.logon.type == "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and
   not user.name == "ANONYMOUS LOGON" and not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName : "*$" and
   not user.domain == "NT AUTHORITY" and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip !="::1"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId

  [iam where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "changed-computer-account" and

    /* if DnsHostName value equal a DC DNS hostname then it's highly suspicious */
    winlog.event_data.DnsHostName : "??*" and

    /* exclude FPs where host.os.type == "windows" and DnsHostName starts with the ComputerName that was changed */
    not startswith~(winlog.event_data.DnsHostName, substring(winlog.event_data.TargetUserName, 0, length(winlog.event_data.TargetUserName) - 1))
    ] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- ID: T1068
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
Technique:
- Name: Valid Accounts
- ID: T1078
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Domain Accounts
- ID: T1078.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/

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