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Process Created with an Elevated Token

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Process Created with an Elevated Token

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Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Privilege Escalation

Version: 4

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */

process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "start" and

 /* CreateProcessWithToken and effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for token theft */
 user.id : "S-1-5-18"  and

 /* Token Theft target process usually running as service are located in one of the following paths */
 process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :
                ("?:\\Windows\\*.exe",
                 "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                 "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                 "?:\\ProgramData\\*") and

/* Ignores Utility Manager in Windows running in debug mode */
 not (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
      process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and process.parent.args : "/debug") and

/* Ignores Windows print spooler service with correlation to Access Intelligent Form */
not (process.parent.executable : "?\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe" and
     process.executable: "?:\\Program Files*\\Access\\Intelligent Form\\*\\LaunchCreate.exe") and

/* Ignores Windows error reporting executables */
 not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
                           "?:\\windows\\system32\\WerMgr.exe",
                           "?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe")  and

 /* Ignores Windows updates from TiWorker.exe that runs with elevated privileges */
 not (process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*\\TiWorker.exe" and
      process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\iissetup.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\iissetup.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetsrv\\aspnetca.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\inetsrv\\aspnetca.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\lodctr.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\lodctr.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\System32\\netcfg.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*\\ngen.exe",
                            "?:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework*\\*\\aspnet_regiis.exe")) and


/* Ignores additional parent executables that run with elevated privileges */
 not process.parent.executable :
               ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe",
                "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe",
                "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
                "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
                "?:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*") and

/* Ignores Windows binaries with a trusted signature and specific signature name */
 not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
      process.code_signature.subject_name :
                ("philandro Software GmbH",
                 "Freedom Scientific Inc.",
                 "TeamViewer Germany GmbH",
                 "Projector.is, Inc.",
                 "TeamViewer GmbH",
                 "Cisco WebEx LLC",
                 "Dell Inc"))

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Create Process with Token
- ID: T1134.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/

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