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Image File Execution Options Injection

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Image File Execution Options Injection

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The Debugger and SilentProcessExit registry keys can allow an adversary to intercept the execution of files, causing a different process to be executed. This functionality can be abused by an adversary to establish persistence.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.*
endgame-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Windows
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Persistence
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Data Source: Elastic Endgame
Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 105

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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registry where host.os.type == "windows" and length(registry.data.strings) > 0 and
  registry.path : (
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
    "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*.exe\\Debugger",
    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\*\\Debugger",
    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess",
    "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\*\\MonitorProcess"
  ) and
    /* add FPs here */
  not registry.data.strings regex~ ("""C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\ThinKiosk\\thinkiosk\.exe""", """.*\\PSAppDeployToolkit\\.*""")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Event Triggered Execution
- ID: T1546
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Image File Execution Options Injection
- ID: T1546.012
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Modify Registry
- ID: T1112
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/

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