IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.
« Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled via Registry »
Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.9] ›Downloadable rule update v8.9.5

Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools

edit

Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools

edit

Identifies attempts to disable EventLog via the logman Windows utility, PowerShell, or auditpol. This is often done by attackers in an attempt to evade detection on a system.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*
  • logs-windows.*
  • endgame-*

Severity: low

Risk score: 21

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: Windows
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Defense Evasion
  • Resources: Investigation Guide
  • Data Source: Elastic Endgame
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 107

Rule authors:

  • Elastic
  • Ivan Ninichuck
  • Austin Songer

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit
## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Disable Windows Event and Security Logs Using Built-in Tools

Windows event logs are a fundamental data source for security monitoring, forensics, and incident response. Adversaries can tamper, clear, and delete this data to break SIEM detections, cover their tracks, and slow down incident response.

This rule looks for the usage of different utilities to disable the EventLog service or specific event logs.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
  - Verify if any other anti-forensics behaviors were observed.
- Investigate the event logs prior to the action for suspicious behaviors that an attacker may be trying to cover up.

### False positive analysis

- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.

### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- Re-enable affected logging components, services, and security monitoring.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).

Rule query

edit
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(
  ((process.name:"logman.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "Logman.exe") and
      process.args : "EventLog-*" and process.args : ("stop", "delete")) or

  ((process.name : ("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or process.pe.original_file_name in
      ("pwsh.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")) and
	process.args : "Set-Service" and process.args: "EventLog" and process.args : "Disabled")  or

  ((process.name:"auditpol.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "AUDITPOL.EXE") and process.args : "/success:disable")
)

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

« Disabling Windows Defender Security Settings via PowerShell DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled via Registry »