Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin
editDeleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin
editIdentifies use of wbadmin.exe to delete the backup catalog. Ransomware and other malware may do this to prevent system recovery.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Impact
Version: 11
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Deleting Backup Catalogs with Wbadmin Windows Server Backup stores the details about your backups (what volumes are backed up and where the backups are located) in a file called a backup catalog, which ransomware victims can use to recover corrupted backup files. Deleting these files is a common step in threat actor playbooks. This rule identifies the deletion of the backup catalog using the `wbadmin.exe` utility. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree). - Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action. - Confirm whether the account owner is aware of the operation. - Investigate other alerts related to the user/host in the last 48 hours. - Check for similar behavior in other hosts on the environment. - Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted. ### False positive analysis - Administrators can use this command to delete corrupted catalogs, but overall the activity is unlikely to be legitimate. ### Related rules - Third-party Backup Files Deleted via Unexpected Process - 11ea6bec-ebde-4d71-a8e9-784948f8e3e9 - Volume Shadow Copy Deleted or Resized via VssAdmin - b5ea4bfe-a1b2-421f-9d47-22a75a6f2921 - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell - d99a037b-c8e2-47a5-97b9-170d076827c4 - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC - dc9c1f74-dac3-48e3-b47f-eb79db358f57 ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity. - Reset the password of the involved accounts. - If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look for ransomware preparation and execution activities. - If any backups were affected: - Perform data recovery locally or restore the backups from replicated copies (cloud, other servers, etc.). ## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editprocess where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and (process.name : "wbadmin.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "WBADMIN.EXE") and process.args : "catalog" and process.args : "delete"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Impact
- ID: TA0040
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
-
Technique:
- Name: Inhibit System Recovery
- ID: T1490
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/