Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI

Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.*
winlogbeat-*
logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References: None

Tags:

Elastic
Host
Windows
Threat Detection
Execution

Version: 4

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit

## Config

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.

Rule query

edit

process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
 process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
 process.args : "\\\\127.0.0.1\\*" and process.args : ("2>&1", "1>")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: Windows Management Instrumentation
- ID: T1047
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/

« Execution via local SxS Shared Module Suspicious WMI Image Load from MS Office »