Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable
editSuspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable
editIdentifies suspicious psexec activity which is executing from the psexec service that has been renamed, possibly to evade detection.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editprocess where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
process.pe.original_file_name : "psexesvc.exe" and not process.name : "PSEXESVC.exe"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: System Services
- ID: T1569
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Service Execution
- ID: T1569.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002/