AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted
editAWS CloudTrail Log Deleted
editIdentifies the deletion of an AWS log trail. An adversary may delete trails in an attempt to evade defenses.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 10 minutes
Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Log Auditing
Version: 6 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.9.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editTrail deletions may be made by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Trail deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Investigation guide
editConfig
The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
Rule query
editevent.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:cloudtrail.amazonaws.com and event.action:DeleteTrail and event.outcome:success
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Rule version history
edit- Version 6 (7.13.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.action:DeleteTrail and event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:cloudtrail.amazonaws.com and event.outcome:success
-
- Version 5 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.11.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.10.0 release)
-
- Formatting only