AWS EC2 Flow Log Deletion
editAWS EC2 Flow Log Deletion
editIdentifies the deletion of one or more flow logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). An adversary may delete flow logs in an attempt to evade defenses.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 10 minutes
Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Log Auditing
Version: 6 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.9.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editVerify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Flow log deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Investigation guide
editConfig
The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
Rule query
editevent.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.action:DeleteFlowLogs and event.outcome:success
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Rule version history
edit- Version 6 (7.13.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.action:DeleteFlowLogs and event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:ec2.amazonaws.com and event.outcome:success
-
- Version 5 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.11.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.10.0 release)
-
- Formatting only