IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer
editUAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer
editIdentifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 3 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Rule query
editprocess where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.executable : "C:\\*\\AppData\\*\\Temp\\IDC*.tmp\\*.exe" and process.parent.name : "ieinstal.exe" and process.parent.args : "-Embedding" /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */ /* and not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) */
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- ID: T1548
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/
Rule version history
edit- Version 3 (7.12.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and wildcard(process.executable, "C:\\*\\AppData\\*\\Temp\\IDC*.tmp\\*.exe") and process.parent.name == "ieinstal.exe" and process.parent.args == "-Embedding" /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */ /* and not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) */
-
- Version 2 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only