AWS IAM Brute Force of Assume Role Policy
editAWS IAM Brute Force of Assume Role Policy
editIdentifies a high number of failed attempts to assume an AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) role. IAM roles are used to delegate access to users or services. An adversary may attempt to enumerate IAM roles in order to determine if a role exists before attempting to assume or hijack the discovered role.
Rule type: threshold
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-20m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Identity and Access
Version: 5 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.9.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Config The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
Rule query
editevent.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:iam.amazonaws.com and event.action:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and aws.cloudtrail.error_code:MalformedPolicyDocumentException and event.outcome:failure
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
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Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
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Technique:
- Name: Brute Force
- ID: T1110
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/
Rule version history
edit- Version 5 (7.13.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (7.12.1 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.12.0 release)
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- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.10.0 release)
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-
Updated query, changed from:
event.module:aws and event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:iam.amazonaws.com and event.action:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy and aws.cloudtrail.error_code:MalformedPolicyDocumentException and event.outcome:failure
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