Windows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell
editWindows Firewall Disabled via PowerShell
editIdentifies when the Windows Firewall is disabled using PowerShell cmdlets, which can help attackers evade network constraints, like internet and network lateral communication restrictions.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/netsecurity/set-netfirewallprofile?view=windowsserver2019-ps
- https://www.tutorialspoint.com/how-to-get-windows-firewall-profile-settings-using-powershell
- http://powershellhelp.space/commands/set-netfirewallrule-psv5.php
- http://woshub.com/manage-windows-firewall-powershell/
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 4 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.0.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.2.0
Rule authors: Austin Songer
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editWindows Firewall can be disabled by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Windows Profile being disabled by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Investigation guide
edit## Config If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
Rule query
editprocess where event.action == "start" and (process.name :
("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") or
process.pe.original_file_name == "PowerShell.EXE") and process.args
: "*Set-NetFirewallProfile*" and (process.args : "*-Enabled*" and
process.args : "*False*") and (process.args : "*-All*" or
process.args : ("*Public*", "*Domain*", "*Private*"))
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Rule version history
edit- Version 4 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (8.1.0 release)
-
- Formatting only