IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Account Password Reset Remotely
editAccount Password Reset Remotely
editIdentifies an attempt to reset a potentially privileged account password remotely. Adversaries may manipulate account passwords to maintain access or evade password duration policies and preserve compromised credentials.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-system.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4724
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz/
- https://github.com/sbousseaden/EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES/blob/master/Credential%20Access/remote_pwd_reset_rpc_mimikatz_postzerologon_target_DC.evtx
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 5 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.0.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editLegitimate remote account administration.
Rule query
editsequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where
event.action == "logged-in" and /* event 4624 need to be logged */
winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and
source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip !=
"::1"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId /* event 4724 need to be
logged */ [iam where event.action == "reset-password" and (
/* This rule is very noisy if not scoped to privileged
accounts, duplicate the rule and add your own naming convention
and accounts of interest here. */
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: ("*Admin*", "*super*", "*SVC*",
"*DC0*", "*service*", "*DMZ*", "*ADM*") or
winlog.event_data.TargetSid : "S-1-5-21-*-500" ) ] by
winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Rule version history
edit- Version 5 (8.4.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and /* event 4624 need to be logged */ winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId /* event 4724 need to be logged */ [iam where event.action == "reset-password"] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
-
- Version 3 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (8.1.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m [authentication where event.action == "logged-in" and /* event 4624 need to be logged */ winlog.logon.type : "Network" and event.outcome == "success" and source.ip != null and not source.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")] by winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId /* event 4724 need to be logged */ [iam where event.action == "reset-password"] by winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId
-