AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account
editAWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account
editIdentifies when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 10 minutes
Searches indices from: now-60m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Asset Visibility
Version: 3 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.14.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Rule authors: Elastic, Austin Songer
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editA domain may be transferred to another AWS account by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Domain transfers from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Investigation guide
editRule query
editevent.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:route53.amazonaws.com and event.action:TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount and event.outcome:success
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
Rule version history
edit- Version 3 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only