IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Suspicious Calendar File Modification
editSuspicious Calendar File Modification
editIdentifies suspicious modifications of the calendar file by an unusual process. Adversaries may create a custom calendar notification procedure to execute a malicious program at a recurring interval to establish persistence.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- auditbeat-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- macOS
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 3 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.12.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editTrusted applications for managing calendars and reminders.
Rule query
editevent.category:file and event.action:modification and file.path:/Users/*/Library/Calendars/*.calendar/Events/*.ics and process.executable: (* and not ( /System/Library/* or /System/Applications/Calendar.app/Contents/MacOS/* or /System/Applications/Mail.app/Contents/MacOS/Mail or /usr/libexec/xpcproxy or /sbin/launchd or /Applications/* ) )
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Event Triggered Execution
- ID: T1546
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
Rule version history
edit- Version 3 (8.4.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:file and event.action:modification and file.path:/Users/*/Library/Calendars/*.calendar/Events/*.ics and process.executable: (* and not ( /System/Library/* or /System/Applications/Calendar.app/Contents/MacOS/* or /usr/libexec/xpcproxy or /sbin/launchd or /Applications/* ) )
-