Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account
editAccount Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account
editIdentifies when the SYSTEM account uses an account discovery utility. This could be a sign of discovery activity after an adversary has achieved privilege escalation.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Discovery
- has_guide
Version: 101 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.7.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Account Discovery Command via SYSTEM Account After successfully compromising an environment, attackers may try to gain situational awareness to plan their next steps. This can happen by running commands to enumerate network resources, users, connections, files, and installed security software. This rule looks for the execution of account discovery utilities using the SYSTEM account, which is commonly observed after attackers successfully perform privilege escalation or exploit web applications. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - If the process tree includes a web-application server process such as w3wp, httpd.exe, nginx.exe and alike, investigate any suspicious file creation or modification in the last 48 hours to assess the presence of any potential webshell backdoor. - Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. - Determine how the SYSTEM account is being used. For example, users with administrator privileges can spawn a system shell using Windows services, scheduled tasks or other third party utilities. ### False positive analysis - Discovery activities are not inherently malicious if they occur in isolation. As long as the analyst did not identify suspicious activity related to the user or host, such alerts can be dismissed. ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection via the same vector. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR). - Use the data collected through the analysis to investigate other machines affected in the environment.
Rule query
editprocess where event.type == "start" and (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and (process.name : "whoami.exe" or (process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe"))
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Discovery
- ID: TA0007
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
-
Technique:
- Name: System Owner/User Discovery
- ID: T1033
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/
Rule version history
edit- Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and (process.name : "whoami.exe" or (process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe"))
-
- Version 14 (8.4.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and (?process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or ?winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and (process.name : "whoami.exe" or (process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe"))
-
- Version 12 (8.3.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 11 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Rule name changed from: Net command via SYSTEM account
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and (process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" or winlog.event_data.IntegrityLevel : "System") and process.name : "whoami.exe" or (process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe")
- Version 9 (8.1.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and user.id in ("S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-19", "S-1-5-20") and process.name : "whoami.exe" or (process.name : "net1.exe" and not process.parent.name : "net.exe")
-
- Version 8 (7.16.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 7 (7.13.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and (process.name:(whoami.exe or net.exe) or process.name:net1.exe and not process.parent.name:net.exe) and user.name:SYSTEM
-
- Version 6 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (7.10.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and (process.name:net.exe or process.name:net1.exe and not process.parent.name:net.exe) and user.name:SYSTEM
-
- Version 3 (7.9.1 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.9.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
(process.name:net.exe or process.name:net1.exe and not process.parent.name:net.exe) and user.name:SYSTEM and event.action:"Process Create (rule: ProcessCreate)"
-