IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
ImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client
editImageLoad via Windows Update Auto Update Client
editIdentifies abuse of the Windows Update Auto Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to load an arbitrary DLL. This behavior is used as a defense evasion technique to blend-in malicious activity with legitimate Windows software.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 101 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editRule query
editprocess where event.type == "start" and (process.pe.original_file_name == "wuauclt.exe" or process.name : "wuauclt.exe") and /* necessary windows update client args to load a dll */ process.args : "/RunHandlerComServer" and process.args : "/UpdateDeploymentProvider" and /* common paths writeable by a standard user where the target DLL can be placed */ process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*.dll", "C:\\ProgramData\\*.dll", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.dll", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.dll")
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: System Binary Proxy Execution
- ID: T1218
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/
Rule version history
edit- Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and (process.pe.original_file_name == "wuauclt.exe" or process.name : "wuauclt.exe") and /* necessary windows update client args to load a dll */ process.args : "/RunHandlerComServer" and process.args : "/UpdateDeploymentProvider" and /* common paths writeable by a standard user where the target DLL can be placed */ process.args : ("C:\\Users\\*.dll", "C:\\ProgramData\\*.dll", "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*.dll", "C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.dll")
-
- Version 9 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 7 (8.3.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only