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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.5] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP

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Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP

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Identifies attempt to coerce a local NTLM authentication via HTTP using the Windows Printer Spooler service as a target. An adversary may use this primitive in combination with other techniques to elevate privileges on a compromised system.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Credential Access

Version: 101 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.3.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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process where event.type == "start" and process.name :
"rundll32.exe" and /* Rundll32 WbeDav Client */ process.args :
("?:\\Windows\\System32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and /* Access to
named pipe via http */ process.args : ("http*/print/pipe/*",
"http*/pipe/spoolss", "http*/pipe/srvsvc")

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 101 (8.5.0 release)

  • Updated query, changed from:

    process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name : "rundll32.exe" and /* Rundll32 WbeDav Client */
process.args : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie") and /* Access
to named pipe via http */ process.args : ("http*/print/pipe/*",
"http*/pipe/spoolss", "http*/pipe/srvsvc")
Version 2 (8.4.0 release)
  • Formatting only
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