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Elastic Docs ›Elastic Security Solution [8.5] ›Detections and alerts ›Prebuilt rule reference

Process Started from Process ID (PID) File

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Process Started from Process ID (PID) File

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Identifies a new process starting from a process ID (PID), lock or reboot file within the temporary file storage paradigm (tmpfs) directory /var/run directory. On Linux, the PID files typically hold the process ID to track previous copies running and manage other tasks. Certain Linux malware use the /var/run directory for holding data, executables and other tasks, disguising itself or these files as legitimate PID files.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: high

Risk score: 73

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Linux
  • Threat Detection
  • Execution
  • BPFDoor

Version: 100 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 8.3.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Potential false positives

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False-Positives (FP) should be at a minimum with this detection as PID files are meant to hold process IDs, not inherently be executables that spawn processes.

Investigation guide

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## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Process Started from Process ID (PID) File
Detection alerts from this rule indicate a process spawned from an executable masqueraded as a legitimate PID file which is very unusual and should not occur. Here are some possible avenues of investigation:
- Examine parent and child process relationships of the new process to determine if other processes are running.
- Examine the /var/run directory using Osquery to determine other potential PID files with unsually large file sizes, indicative of it being an executable: "SELECT f.size, f.uid, f.type, f.path from file f WHERE path like '/var/run/%%';"
- Examine the reputation of the SHA256 hash from the PID file in a database like VirusTotal to identify additional pivots and artifacts for investigation.

Rule query

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process where event.type == "start" and user.id == "0" and
process.executable regex~ """/var/run/\w+\.(pid|lock|reboot)"""

Threat mapping

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Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

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Version 100 (8.5.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (8.4.0 release)
  • Formatting only
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