Remote Execution via File Shares

edit

Identifies the execution of a file that was created by the virtual system process. This may indicate lateral movement via network file shares.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.*
  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5 minutes

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Lateral Movement

Version: 101 (version history)

Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.11.0

Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0

Rule authors: Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

edit
## Triage and analysis

### Investigating Remote Execution via File Shares

Adversaries can use network shares to host tooling to support the compromise of other hosts in the environment. These
tools can include discovery utilities, credential dumpers, malware, etc.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files
for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Review adjacent login events (e.g., 4624) in the alert timeframe to identify the account used to perform this action.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Retrieve the process executable and determine if it is malicious:
  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
    - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
      - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
      - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
      - Service creation and launch activities.
      - Scheduled tasks creation.
  - Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
    - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.

### False positive analysis

- This activity can happen legitimately. Consider adding exceptions if it is expected and noisy in your environment.

### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
  - Stop suspicious processes.
  - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
  - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that
  attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Review the privileges needed to write to the network share and restrict write access as needed.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and
malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the
mean time to respond (MTTR).

Rule query

edit
sequence with maxspan=1m [file where event.type in ("creation",
"change") and process.pid == 4 and file.extension : "exe"] by host.id,
file.path [process where event.type == "start"] by host.id,
process.executable

Threat mapping

edit

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

Rule version history

edit
Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
  • Updated query, changed from:

    sequence with maxspan=1m [file where event.type in ("creation",
    "change") and process.pid == 4 and file.extension : "exe"] by host.id,
    file.path [process where event.type in ("start", "process_started")]
    by host.id, process.executable
Version 3 (8.4.0 release)
  • Formatting only
Version 2 (7.12.0 release)
  • Formatting only