IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility
editRemote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility
editIdentifies the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Command and Control
- has_guide
Version: 101 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.10.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Remote File Download via Desktopimgdownldr Utility Attackers commonly transfer tooling or malware from external systems into a compromised environment using the command and control channel. However, they can also abuse signed utilities to drop these files. The `Desktopimgdownldr.exe` utility is used to to configure lockscreen/desktop image, and can be abused with the `lockscreenurl` argument to download remote files and tools, this rule looks for this behavior. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action. - Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity. - Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. - Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts. - Check the reputation of the domain or IP address used to host the downloaded file or if the user downloaded the file from an internal system. - Retrieve the file and determine if it is malicious: - Identify the file type. - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis. - Observe and collect information about the following activities: - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities. - Service creation and launch activities. - Scheduled task creation. - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values. - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. ### False positive analysis - This activity is unusual but can be done by administrators. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary. - Analysts can dismiss the alert if the downloaded file is a legitimate image. ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. - Stop suspicious processes. - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. - Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Rule query
editprocess where event.type == "start" and (process.name : "desktopimgdownldr.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "desktopimgdownldr.exe") and process.args : "/lockscreenurl:http*"
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Command and Control
- ID: TA0011
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
-
Technique:
- Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
- ID: T1105
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
Rule version history
edit- Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and (process.name : "desktopimgdownldr.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "desktopimgdownldr.exe") and process.args : "/lockscreenurl:http*"
-
- Version 9 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 7 (8.3.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 6 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (7.13.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and (process.name:desktopimgdownldr.exe or process.pe.original_file_name:desktopimgdownldr.exe) and process.args:/lockscreenurl\:http*
-
- Version 4 (7.12.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (7.11.2 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.11.0 release)
-
-
Updated query, changed from:
event.category:process and event.type:(start or process_started) and (process.name:desktopimgdownldr.exe or process.pe.original_file_name:desktopimgdownldr.exe or winlog.event_data.OriginalFileName:desktopimgdownldr.exe) and process.args:/lockscreenurl\:http*
-