IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification
editSuspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification
editIdentifies suspicious startup shell folder modifications to change the default Startup directory in order to bypass detections monitoring file creation in the Windows Startup folder.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
- has_guide
Version: 101 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.13.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.5.0
Rule authors: Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Suspicious Startup Shell Folder Modification Techniques used within malware and by adversaries often leverage the Windows registry to store malicious programs for persistence. Startup shell folders are often targeted as they are not as prevalent as normal Startup folder paths so this behavior may evade existing AV/EDR solutions. These programs may also run with higher privileges which can be ideal for an attacker. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - Review the source process and related file tied to the Windows Registry entry. - Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity or legitimate software installations. - Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts. - Retrieve the file and determine if it is malicious: - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis. - Observe and collect information about the following activities: - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. - File and registry access, modification, and creation activities. - Service creation and launch activities. - Scheduled task creation. - Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values. - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. ### False positive analysis - There is a high possibility of benign legitimate programs being added to shell folders. This activity could be based on new software installations, patches, or other network administrator activity. Before undertaking further investigation, it should be verified that this activity is not benign. ### Related rules - Startup or Run Key Registry Modification - 97fc44d3-8dae-4019-ae83-298c3015600f - Persistent Scripts in the Startup Directory - f7c4dc5a-a58d-491d-9f14-9b66507121c0 ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. - If the malicious file was delivered via phishing: - Block the email sender from sending future emails. - Block the malicious web pages. - Remove emails from the sender from mailboxes. - Consider improvements to the security awareness program. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Rule query
editregistry where registry.path : ( "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Common Startup", "HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Common Startup", "HKEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Wi ndows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders\\Startup", "H KEY_USERS\\*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\ Shell Folders\\Startup" ) and registry.data.strings != null and /* Normal Startup Folder Paths */ not registry.data.strings : ( "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup", "%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup", "%USERPROFILE%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup", "C:\\Users\\*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup" )
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- ID: T1547
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/
Rule version history
edit- Version 101 (8.5.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 7 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 6 (8.3.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 5 (8.2.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 4 (8.1.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (7.16.0 release)
-
- Formatting only