Suspicious Print Spooler File Deletion
editSuspicious Print Spooler File Deletion
editDetects deletion of print driver files by an unusual process. This may indicate a clean up attempt post successful privilege escalation via Print Spooler service related vulnerabilities.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
- endgame-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Privilege Escalation
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Use Case: Vulnerability
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Sysmon
Version: 106
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Setup
editSetup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
event.ingested to @timestamp.
For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
Rule query
editfile where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type : "deletion" and
not process.name : ("spoolsv.exe", "dllhost.exe", "explorer.exe") and
file.path : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\spool\\drivers\\x64\\3\\*.dll"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- ID: T1068
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/