AWS RDS Snapshot Restored
editAWS RDS Snapshot Restored
editIdentifies when an attempt was made to restore an RDS Snapshot. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data or evade detection after performing malicious activities. If the permissions were modified, verify if the snapshot was shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: None (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Cloud
- Data Source: AWS
- Data Source: Amazon Web Services
- Use Case: Asset Visibility
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
Version: 206
Rule authors:
- Austin Songer
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
editSetup
editThe AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule.
Rule query
editevent.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:rds.amazonaws.com and event.action:RestoreDBInstanceFromDBSnapshot and event.outcome:success
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
- ID: T1578
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Revert Cloud Instance
- ID: T1578.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004/