IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the current release documentation.

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System Log File Deletion

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System Log File Deletion

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Identifies the deletion of sensitive Linux system logs. This may indicate an attempt to evade detection or destroy forensic evidence on a system.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

auditbeat-*
logs-endpoint.events.*
endgame-*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/11/live-off-the-land-an-overview-of-unc1945.html

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: Linux
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Data Source: Elastic Endgame
Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 106

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Investigation guide

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Rule query

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file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "deletion" and
  file.path :
    (
    "/var/run/utmp",
    "/var/log/wtmp",
    "/var/log/btmp",
    "/var/log/lastlog",
    "/var/log/faillog",
    "/var/log/syslog",
    "/var/log/messages",
    "/var/log/secure",
    "/var/log/auth.log",
    "/var/log/boot.log",
    "/var/log/kern.log"
    ) and
    not process.name : ("gzip")

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Indicator Removal
- ID: T1070
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
- ID: T1070.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/002/

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