IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
Wireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command
editWireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command
editIdentifies attempts to dump Wireless saved access keys in clear text using the Windows built-in utility Netsh.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
- endgame-*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Credential Access
- Tactic: Discovery
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
Version: 6
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Wireless Credential Dumping using Netsh Command Netsh is a Windows command line tool used for network configuration and troubleshooting. It enables the management of network settings and adapters, wireless network profiles, and other network-related tasks. This rule looks for patterns used to dump credentials from wireless network profiles using Netsh, which can enable attackers to bring their own devices to the network. > **Note**: > This investigation guide uses the {security-guide}/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin]) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. - Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behavior in the alert timeframe: - Observe and collect information about the following activities in the alert subject host: - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} ### False positive analysis - This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary. ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. - Review the privileges assigned to the user to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Rule query
editprocess where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and (process.name : "netsh.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name == "netsh.exe") and process.args : "wlan" and process.args : "key*clear"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Credential Access
- ID: TA0006
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
-
Technique:
- Name: OS Credential Dumping
- ID: T1003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
-
Technique:
- Name: Credentials from Password Stores
- ID: T1555
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Discovery
- ID: TA0007
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
-
Technique:
- Name: System Information Discovery
- ID: T1082
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/