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Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification

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Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification

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Identifies the use of sqlite3 to directly modify the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) SQLite database. This may indicate an attempt to bypass macOS privacy controls, including access to sensitive resources like the system camera, microphone, address book, and calendar.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

logs-endpoint.events.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

Domain: Endpoint
OS: macOS
Use Case: Threat Detection
Tactic: Defense Evasion
Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: 106

Rule authors:

Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Rule query

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process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : "sqlite*" and
 process.args : "/*/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db" and
 not process.parent.executable : "/Library/Bitdefender/AVP/product/bin/*"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK^TM

Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- ID: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Disable or Modify Tools
- ID: T1562.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/

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