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Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver
editPotential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver
editIdentifies a potential exploitation of InstallerTakeOver (CVE-2021-41379) default PoC execution. Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged user to escalate privileges to SYSTEM.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Privilege Escalation
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Use Case: Vulnerability
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
Version: 109
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating Potential Privilege Escalation via InstallerFileTakeOver InstallerFileTakeOver is a weaponized escalation of privilege proof of concept (EoP PoC) to the CVE-2021-41379 vulnerability. Upon successful exploitation, an unprivileged user will escalate privileges to SYSTEM/NT AUTHORITY. This rule detects the default execution of the PoC, which overwrites the `elevation_service.exe` DACL and copies itself to the location to escalate privileges. An attacker is able to still take over any file that is not in use (locked), which is outside the scope of this rule. > **Note**: > This investigation guide uses the {security-guide}/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html[Osquery Markdown Plugin] introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide. #### Possible investigation steps - Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. - Look for additional processes spawned by the process, command lines, and network communications. - Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts. - Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities: - Analyze the file using a private sandboxed analysis system. - Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host: - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses. - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`. - Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries. - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve DNS Cache","query":"SELECT * FROM dns_cache"}} - Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree. - Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries. - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve All Services","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services"}} - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts","query":"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\nuser_account == null)\n"}} - !{osquery{"label":"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link","query":"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\n"}} - Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc. - Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification. ### False positive analysis - Verify whether a digital signature exists in the executable, and if it is valid. ### Related rules - Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation - bfeaf89b-a2a7-48a3-817f-e41829dc61ee ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts. - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware. - Stop suspicious processes. - Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs). - Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system. - Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Rule query
editprocess where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name : "System" and ( (process.name : "elevation_service.exe" and not process.pe.original_file_name == "elevation_service.exe") or (process.name : "elevation_service.exe" and not process.code_signature.trusted == true) or (process.parent.name : "elevation_service.exe" and process.name : ("rundll32.exe", "cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")) ) and not ( process.name : "elevation_service.exe" and process.code_signature.trusted == true and process.pe.original_file_name == null )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
-
Technique:
- Name: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- ID: T1068
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/