IMPORTANT: No additional bug fixes or documentation updates
will be released for this version. For the latest information, see the
current release documentation.
PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
editPowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
editThis rule detects the use of discovery-related Windows API functions in PowerShell Scripts. Attackers can use these functions to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Discovery
- Tactic: Collection
- Tactic: Execution
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: PowerShell Logs
Version: 111
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Investigation guide
edit## Triage and analysis ### Investigating PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions PowerShell is one of the main tools system administrators use for automation, report routines, and other tasks. This makes it available for use in various environments, and creates an attractive way for attackers to execute code. Attackers can use PowerShell to interact with the Win32 API to bypass command line based detections, using libraries like PSReflect or Get-ProcAddress Cmdlet. #### Possible investigation steps - Examine the script content that triggered the detection; look for suspicious DLL imports, collection or exfiltration capabilities, suspicious functions, encoded or compressed data, and other potentially malicious characteristics. - Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures. - Examine file or network events from the involved PowerShell process for suspicious behavior. - Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours. - Evaluate whether the user needs to use PowerShell to complete tasks. - Check for additional PowerShell and command-line logs that indicate that imported functions were run. ### False positive analysis - Discovery activities themselves are not inherently malicious if occurring in isolation, as long as the script does not contain other capabilities, and there are no other alerts related to the user or host; such alerts can be dismissed. However, analysts should keep in mind that this is not a common way of getting information, making it suspicious. ### Related rules - PowerShell PSReflect Script - 56f2e9b5-4803-4e44-a0a4-a52dc79d57fe ### Response and remediation - Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage. - Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior. - Restrict PowerShell usage outside of IT and engineering business units using GPOs, AppLocker, Intune, or similar software. - Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector. - Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components. - Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
Rule query
editevent.category:process and host.os.type:windows and powershell.file.script_block_text : ( NetShareEnum or NetWkstaUserEnum or NetSessionEnum or NetLocalGroupEnum or NetLocalGroupGetMembers or DsGetSiteName or DsEnumerateDomainTrusts or WTSEnumerateSessionsEx or WTSQuerySessionInformation or LsaGetLogonSessionData or QueryServiceObjectSecurity or GetComputerNameEx or NetWkstaGetInfo or GetUserNameEx or NetUserEnum or NetUserGetInfo or NetGroupEnum or NetGroupGetInfo or NetGroupGetUsers or NetWkstaTransportEnum or NetServerGetInfo or LsaEnumerateTrustedDomains or NetScheduleJobEnum or NetUserModalsGet ) and not user.id : ("S-1-5-18" or "S-1-5-19")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Discovery
- ID: TA0007
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
-
Technique:
- Name: Permission Groups Discovery
- ID: T1069
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Local Groups
- ID: T1069.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/001/
-
Technique:
- Name: Account Discovery
- ID: T1087
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: Local Account
- ID: T1087.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
-
Technique:
- Name: Domain Trust Discovery
- ID: T1482
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/
-
Technique:
- Name: Network Share Discovery
- ID: T1135
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
-
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
-
Sub-technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- ID: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
-
Technique:
- Name: Native API
- ID: T1106
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106/
-
Tactic:
- Name: Collection
- ID: TA0009
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009/
-
Technique:
- Name: Data from Network Shared Drive
- ID: T1039
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039/