AWS RDS Snapshot Restored
editAWS RDS Snapshot Restored
editIdentifies when an attempt was made to restore an RDS Snapshot. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data or evade detection after performing malicious activities. If the permissions were modified, verify if the snapshot was shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5 minutes
Searches indices from: now-6m (Date Math format, see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Cloud
- AWS
- Continuous Monitoring
- SecOps
- Asset Visibility
- Defense Evasion
Version: 5 (version history)
Added (Elastic Stack release): 7.16.0
Last modified (Elastic Stack release): 8.4.0
Rule authors: Austin Songer
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Potential false positives
editRestoring snapshots may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Snapshot restoration by unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
Investigation guide
editRule query
editevent.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:rds.amazonaws.com and event.action:RestoreDBInstanceFromDBSnapshot and event.outcome:success
Threat mapping
editFramework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
-
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
-
Technique:
- Name: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
- ID: T1578
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/
Rule version history
edit- Version 5 (8.4.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 3 (8.1.0 release)
-
- Formatting only
- Version 2 (8.0.0 release)
-
- Formatting only